

Three Postures, One Battalion: Concept for the Engagement Mechanism of Territorial Development Infantry Battalions

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ABSTRACT

The 2026 Trisula Nusantara Shield Doctrine mandates the establishment of 593 Territorial Development Infantry Battalions, each with an organizational strength of 1,190 personnel. Functionally, the battalions perform combat and territorial functions, while the territorial function includes food security, development, and health-related activities. Although existing regulations have established the units' existence, organization, and principal tasks, operational mechanisms governing the shift of main effort between combat and territorial functions, engagement authority, the governance of territorial activities, and the measurement of unit readiness have not yet been clearly formulated. This study aims to formulate a concept for the engagement mechanism of Territorial Development Infantry Battalions that is theoretically defensible and can be further developed as a basis for implementing guidelines. The study employs a qualitative case study approach supported by strategic factor analysis using IFAS, EFAS, SFAS, the Internal-External Matrix, TOWS, and QSPM. Data were collected through document review, semi-structured interviews with seven informants representing several institutional levels and elements, and non-participant observation conducted at one deployed battalion in Central Lampung Regency. The findings indicate that personnel fulfillment has not yet fully met organizational requirements, personnel placement in functional companies has not been entirely based on technical qualifications, and some agricultural machinery at the observed unit has not been optimally utilized. An internal score of 2.15 and an external score of 2.12 indicate the need for governance consolidation. Based on these findings, the study formulates five main concepts: tiered engagement, a mechanism for shifting the main effort between combat and territorial functions, the combat granular concept, a command-and-control chain with civil deconfliction, and a dual readiness index. The novelty of this study lies in formulating a battalion-level governance mechanism that integrates engagement authority, functional transition, personnel competence, civil coordination, and readiness measurement within a single conceptual framework.

Keywords: *Territorial Development Battalion, Total Defense, Civil-Military Relations, Strategic Factor Analysis, Food Security*

1. INTRODUCTION

Indonesia's defense architecture fundamentally changed when the Trident Shield Doctrine of the Archipelago came into effect in 2026 [1]. One of the most influential provisions was the establishment of 593 Territorial Development Infantry Battalions in nearly all regencies and cities, each with a TOP of 1,190 soldiers [2], [3]. This policy was not born out of national conditions. Rice imports reached 4.52 million tons in 2024 [4], while national rice production recovered to 34.69 million tons in 2025, an increase of 13.29 percent [5]. Food security has since become one of the stated considerations behind the expansion of the Indonesian Army's role in the self-sufficiency program [6].

The regulatory issue lies in the relationship and boundaries of authority between these three positions. The 2025 Army Chief of Staff's Doctrine and two Army Chief of Staff Regulations have addressed the questions of what and who, namely which units are formed, how they are structured, and what their primary duties are. However, five issues remain inadequately addressed: the hierarchical authority for involving units, the thresholds that trigger shifts in emphasis between

positions, the governance of production results, the limits of civilian control, and the benchmarks for combat readiness. Ignoring these five aspects when hundreds of battalions are being formed risks overlapping authorities and an immeasurable decline in combat readiness.

Unlike conventional infantry battalions, whose primary task is to conduct close-quarters combat, the Territorial Development Infantry Battalion (Yonif TP) is designed to carry out two primary functions: combat and territorial. The combat function is aimed at ensuring the unit's readiness to carry out operational tasks in accordance with the primary function of the infantry unit. Meanwhile, the territorial function is implemented through development and strengthening of regional resilience in collaboration with local governments and community components. In carrying out these territorial functions, Yonif TP has capabilities aimed at supporting regional resilience, including through strengthening food security in the fields of agriculture and animal husbandry, development or construction activities, and health services. Thus, agricultural, animal husbandry, development, and health activities are not positioned as separate functions from the territorial function, but rather as part of the instrument for implementing territorial development in order to realize regional resilience.

The regulatory issue then lies in how the relationship between the combat and territorial functions is managed so that they can run in balance without compromising the unit's operational readiness. The Army Chief of Staff's Doctrine and Regulations, which form the basis for the formation of the TP Infantry Battalion, have provided a framework regarding the organization, structure, main tasks, and functions of the unit. However, more detailed regulations are still needed regarding the implementation mechanisms of both functions, particularly regarding the hierarchical authority in unit involvement, the mechanism for determining priorities between combat and territorial tasks, the governance of the results of food security and development activities, the coordination pattern and limits of authority with local governments, and the indicators used to measure the unit's operational readiness. Clarity on these aspects is crucial so that the implementation of the TP Infantry Battalion's territorial function can contribute to regional resilience without creating overlapping authority with local governments or reducing the unit's readiness in carrying out its combat function.

Based on the literature reviewed in this research, studies related to this issue can be grouped into four clusters, while studies that directly discuss the mechanisms of involvement of the Territorial Development Infantry Battalion are still limited. The first cluster discusses civil-military relations in Indonesia after the 1998 reforms at the macro level: military politics and institutional change [7], [8], the state of relations after the reform period [9], the dynamics of promotions in the officer corps [10], parliamentary oversight which according to [11] is stable but still transitional, civilian authority in the Ministry of Defense which according to [12] remains limited to semi-civilian ministers, and traces of the dual function [13], [14]. The second cluster encompasses temporary military assistance programs in development, disaster management, and food storage, which are recurring programs rather than permanent structures. The third cluster presents international comparisons, ranging from Singapore's Total Defence, which ties social security to defense capability [15], to Europe's development from total defense to comprehensive national defense [16], to permanent military-agricultural institutions such as the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps [17], [18]. The fourth cluster is national doctrinal roots, from Sishankamrata to Nasution's thinking on territorial warfare and guerrilla logistics [19], alongside civilian studies on food security

governance [20]. One early publication addressed the Territorial Development Infantry Battalion directly and outlined its role in food security [6], but that study focused on role description.

This research's theoretical position is constructed in a layered manner. Concordance theory serves as the primary foundation for assessing the legitimacy and limits of military involvement in the social realm through the relationship between the military, political elites, and citizens [21], [22]. Objective civilian control is used as a critical perspective to examine whether the division of authority and functions maintains military professionalism [23]. Nasution's thinking on territorial warfare and locally supported logistics provides a doctrinal genealogy for the battle granary concept. Human capital theory explains that productivity is influenced by investments in education, training, and competence, not solely the availability of physical capital [24]. Furthermore, collaborative governance is used to interpret the need for institutionalizing coordination between military organizations, government, and civilian technical actors [25], [26]. Meanwhile, strategic management provides analytical tools in the form of IFAS, EFAS, SFAS, Internal-External Matrix, TOWS, and QSPM [27], [28]; these tools are used as mapping and prioritization tools, not as defense theories.

Studies of Indonesian civil-military relations have so far focused primarily on policy and programmatic issues, while research on the Territorial Development Infantry Battalion has been limited to role descriptions. The research gap lies in the lack of a framework that explains the engagement mechanism of permanent multi-posture units at the battalion level, linking authority, posture transition, competency, civilian coordination, and readiness measurement. The novelty of this research lies in the formulation of an engagement mechanism that integrates these five aspects into a single governance concept at the battalion level. Three questions guide this research: what strategic factors determine battalion engagement at the district level; how these factors are prioritized and intertwined into the choice of engagement strategies; and what kind of engagement mechanism concept can close the implementation gap. The objective of this research is to formulate an engagement mechanism concept that can be theoretically defended and developed into material for developing implementation guidelines.

2. METHODS

This research employed a qualitative case study design [29] with an embedded quantitative strategic assessment component. The qualitative approach served as the backbone of the research, while the figures in the strategic matrix were used to aid in factor mapping, comparison, and prioritization; they were not treated as independent quantitative datasets. Concept development followed the logic of synthesizing theory and empirical evidence as used in developing the conceptual framework [30]. The unit of analysis was the engagement mechanism of the Territorial Development Infantry Battalion within the Indonesian Army during the initial formation phase of 2025-2026. The research did not discuss budget details, equipment procurement, or agronomic aspects of food production.

Secondary data comes from a document review [31] of the 2026 Doctrine, Army Chief of Staff Regulations Number 1 and Number 7 of 2025, records of the formation and personnel strength of the Indonesian Army Planning Staff as of June 22, 2026, and relevant legal frameworks. Primary data came from semi-structured interviews conducted in August-September 2026 with seven informants purposively selected to represent the institutional chains and expertise that determine engagement, namely the personnel planning officer at the Indonesian Army Headquarters (I-1), the Commander of the 43rd/Muria Territorial Development Infantry Brigade (I-2), the Pasipers Yonif TP 451/Satria Mangkubumi (I-3), an academic who leads a research and community service institution and alumni association of the Bogor Agricultural University (E-1), an agribusiness practitioner (E-2),

an inspector at the National Nutrition Agency with twenty-three years of experience at the Ministry of Agriculture (E-3), and the Head of the Lampung Province Food Security, Food Crops, and Horticulture Service (E-4). Five informants were interviewed verbally and two provided written responses to the same protocol. Thus, the scope of the interview data was not limited to a single battalion. Non-participatory observation was specifically carried out in one battalion that had been deployed in Central Lampung Regency, with the observation targets being production facilities and their utilization.

The document review followed [31] three iterative stages: cursory reading, comprehensive reading, and interpretation. Interview data were analyzed thematically through data condensation, data presentation, and conclusion drawing [32], then triangulated with documents and observations before being converted into strategic factors. A factor was included in the matrix if it was supported by at least two independent sources. Weights represented the relative importance of the factor based on the consistency of occurrence across sources and the strength of documentary support, while ratings reflected the unit's actual condition for internal factors and the adequacy of the organization's response to external factors. Each score was accompanied by written justification in the research notes to maintain an audit trail. Key factors were then filtered through the SFAS, positioned on the Internal-External Matrix and quadrant diagram, and intersected through the TOWS to generate strategic alternatives.

In the final stage, the Quantitative Strategic Planning Matrix (QSPM) is used to compare the relative attractiveness of strategic alternatives based on the same strategic factors [28]. The weight of each factor is taken from the SFAS. Each alternative is assigned an Attractiveness Score (AS) on a scale of 1-4, with 1 indicating relatively low attractiveness and 4 indicating relatively high attractiveness in response to the factor in question. The Total Attractiveness Score (TAS) is calculated using the formula $TAS = \text{Weight} \times AS$, while the sum of all TAS produces the total attractiveness score for each alternative. In this study, the QSPM is treated as a prioritization tool that still relies on qualitative justification, not as a stand-alone mathematical decision. Because the differences in total scores between alternatives are relatively small, its interpretation focuses on the proximity of priorities and prerequisite relationships between alternatives, rather than solely on the numerical order.

The validity of the research was maintained through triangulation of sources and techniques, an audit trail consisting of coded transcripts and score justifications, open reporting of score summaries, and in-depth descriptions of the observation loci. Ethical safeguards included informed consent, written approval, anonymization of informants, and restrictions on citation of unclassified materials.

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The document review reveals a consistent pattern. All available regulations govern institutional matters, namely unit formation, organizational structure, and main tasks, while the procedural aspects of involvement are unwritten. The 2026 Doctrine provides the basis for the formation and establishes three postures; Army Chief of Staff Regulation Number 1 of 2025 regulates battalion organization, including production companies in the fields of agriculture, animal husbandry, construction, and health, within a TOP of 1,190 personnel; and Army Chief of Staff Regulation Number 7 of 2025 does the same at the brigade level. None of the five implementation matters identified in the introduction are regulated in the documents reviewed, as summarized in Table 1.

Table 1. Coverage of engagement aspects in core regulations

Aspects of involvement	2026 Doctrine	Army Chief of Staff Regulation 1/2025	Army Chief of Staff Regulation 7/2025
Formation and existence	Arranged	Arranged	Arranged
Organization and TOP	General directions	Arranged	Arranged
Main tasks of the unit	Arranged	Arranged	Arranged

Multi-level engagement authority	Not regulated	Not regulated	Not regulated
Interposture transition threshold	Not regulated	Not regulated	Not regulated
Production management	Not regulated	Not regulated	Not regulated
Limits of civil control	Not regulated	Not regulated	Not regulated
Readiness benchmark per posture	Not regulated	Not regulated	Not regulated

Source: Document Review, 2026.

Field data illustrates the consequences of this regulatory vacuum. The Indonesian Army Personnel Staff Records as of June 22, 2026, show that the development of Territorial Infantry Brigades and Battalions is progressing rapidly, while personnel needs have not been optimally met. A similar pattern is evident at the unit level, where the actual strength of brigades and battalions remains below the Organizational and Personnel Table, while the availability of officers in the observed units does not fully align with the organizational structure (I-2; I-3, interviews, September 2026). Nevertheless, informants considered meeting the number of personnel not the most pressing obstacle. A central-level personnel development officer stated that the greater challenge is not achieving the Organizational and Personnel Table figures, but rather ensuring that personnel composition meets organizational needs, so that success indicators are not sufficiently quantitative (I-1, interview, September 2026). Placement in agricultural, livestock, and fisheries companies is not yet based on technical qualifications, and meeting the need for manning still relies on a number of transferred personnel with farming experience.

"The biggest challenge isn't just how to reach 1,190 personnel, but how to ensure that those 1,190 personnel have the right composition, according to the organizational structure and capability needs of the TP Infantry Battalion. Therefore, the indicators of success are not only quantitative but must also be qualitative." (I-1, written response, September 2026)

Field observations at the TP 848/SPC Infantry Battalion in Central Lampung revealed a significant gap between the availability of facilities and their utilization. The unit had received a complete set of modern mechanization equipment, including a four-wheeled tractor with a plate plow, an excavator, two hand tractors, a rice planting machine, a water pump with suction and discharge hoses, and a generator set. Most of this equipment remained in its factory packaging and was stored in the unit's hall and warehouse, not on the farmland. There was no agricultural equipment and machinery management unit at the battalion level. A National Nutrition Agency inspector, based on his experience at the Ministry of Agriculture, assessed that equipment delivered without a management unit tended to be underutilized (E-3, interview, September 2026). Interpreted through human capital theory, these findings indicate an imbalance between the availability of physical capital and the readiness of the human capital needed to transform assets into productive capacity [24].

"There might be a unit that manages agricultural equipment and machinery services, called an UPJA. The TNI definitely has one." (E-3, interview, September 2026; researcher confirms that such a unit does not yet exist in the observation unit)

Figure 1 documents the conditions described above. The photo was taken during the observation and records four types of agricultural machinery that the unit had received and their storage conditions on the day of the visit.



(a) Four-wheel tractor with disc plow.



(b) Excavator.



(c) Two hand tractors and generator sets.



(d) Rice planting machines and equipment.

Figure 1. Agricultural machinery received by the observation unit

Source: Field Observation, Central Lampung Regency, September 2026.

The visual documentation supports the finding that the unit's issues relate to the ability to utilize the equipment, not its availability. On the day of the observation, some equipment was unused, while others were still stored in their packaging. This situation indicates that the productive value of the assets cannot be optimized without qualified operators, maintenance mechanisms, and an adequate management unit.

Competency development has begun but has not yet been coordinated and formalized in policy. Training for battalion soldiers is conducted through the Ministry of Agriculture's agricultural training center in Lembang, with 51 soldiers trained in April 2026 and 50 soldiers in the second batch from late August to early September 2026. Competency certification schemes are available through the ministry's professional certification agency and the national certification body. Compared to the number of units that have been deployed, this achievement indicates that technical training is still in the form of an activity program and has not yet become a unit training cycle. Academic sources argued that the success of training is determined by four conditions: the quality of the trainer, the balance between theory and field practice, the availability of training facilities, and visits to pilot sites. Furthermore, mentoring must combine academics and practitioners, as field conditions rarely follow the sequence outlined in textbooks (E-1; E-2, interviews, September 2026). Practitioners added that commodity selection must be preceded by mapping local agroclimatic potential and followed by post-training mentoring; otherwise, training investment will evaporate.

"We have training centers. For example, the Agricultural Training Center in Lembang has training centers for horticultural crops, vegetables, and food crops. There, we can collaborate on farming techniques, how to select good seeds, tissue culture, and so on." (E-3, interview, September 2026)

Externally, coordination with the regions is ongoing but not yet well-organized. The provincial food agency reported the granting of approximately 59 hectares of land to the observation unit, which has been planted with corn and sugar cane and is being used for catfish, laying hens, and goat farming; a simultaneous planting program of approximately 500 hectares involving

regional commands, extension workers, and farmer groups; land optimization of more than 15,000 hectares; and provincial rice production of approximately 3.25 million tons in 2025 with a target of 3.5 million tons in 2026, alongside a deficit of 2,780 tons of shallots, 3,266 tons of cayenne pepper, and 1,690 tons of large chilies as of August 2026 (E-4, interview, September 2026). The same interviewee stated that synergy needs to start with data, namely regional food balances, surplus and deficit commodities, agro-ecosystem suitability, water availability, and market potential. He also stated that battalions should not receive separate technical guidance but should instead work under an integrated production plan that defines commodities, targets, technical responsibilities, sources of production inputs, mentoring, and joint evaluation. A structural complication emerged in the same interview: agricultural extension workers have been transferred to the central government based on Presidential Instruction No. 3 of 2025, thus eliminating provincial authority over them. Technical assistance must therefore be sought through the ministry, while regional governments retain authority over land, production inputs, and food demand data, making the two-way collaboration design a necessity, not an option.

"The starting point must be data. We need to look at regional food needs, the food balance, commodity surpluses and deficits, agro-ecosystem suitability, water availability, and market potential. From there, we can determine the most appropriate activities for the unit." (E-4, written response, September 2026)

"Yonif TP should not receive separate technical directives without a unified plan. Ideally, there should be an integrated production plan that defines commodities, targets, technical personnel, sources of production facilities, mentoring, and evaluation mechanisms." (E-4, written response, September 2026)

These findings were converted into strategic factors and scored as reported in Tables 2 and 3. The internal weighted score was 2.15 and the external weighted score was 2.12, both below the midpoint of 2.50, which places the program in the middle cell of the Internal-External matrix, a cell commonly read as sustain and maintain, rather than aggressive growth [28].

Table 2. Internal Factor Analysis Summary (IFAS)

Code	Internal factors	Weight	Ranking	Score
S1	The presence of units in almost all districts and cities	0.09	4	0.36
S2	Organic production company in the fields of agriculture, animal husbandry, construction and health	0.09	4	0.36
S3	Modern agricultural machinery has been received by the unit	0.08	3	0.24
S4	The standardized TNI AD personnel development cycle	0.07	3	0.21
S5	Discipline, mobility, and territorial network of units	0.07	3	0.21
W1	There are no instructions for implementing involvement yet	0.12	1	0.12
W2	Personnel fulfillment is not yet optimal for organizational needs	0.11	1	0.11
W3	Placement is not yet based on technical qualifications	0.11	1	0.11
W4	Technical training outside the unit training coaching cycle	0.09	2	0.18
W5	Alsintan has not been utilized and there is no management unit	0.09	1	0.09
W6	There is no database of dual competencies and readiness measures yet.	0.08	2	0.16
	Total	1.00		2.15

Source: Processed From Interviews, Observations, and Documents, 2026.

Table 3. External Factor Analysis Summary (EFAS)

Code	External factors	Weight	Ranking	Score
O1	Food self-sufficiency as a national priority program	0.10	3	0.30
O2	Ministry training and national competency certification schemes	0.10	3	0.30
O3	Local government support in the form of land and production facilities	0.09	3	0.27
O4	Regional commodity deficit as absorption of results	0.08	2	0.16
O5	PPPK technical personnel and vocational graduates as recruitment sources	0.08	1	0.08
O6	National food reserve mechanism as a governance interface	0.07	2	0.14
T1	Age limit for acceptance and absence of expertise pathway	0.09	2	0.18
T2	Public perception of the militarization of the civilian sector	0.09	1	0.09
T3	Friction of authority with regional civil institutions	0.08	2	0.16
T4	The withdrawal of extension workers to the center removes provincial authority.	0.07	2	0.14
T5	Decreased combat readiness when the unit is in a development posture	0.08	2	0.16
T6	Land conversion, climate fluctuations, and budget constraints	0.07	2	0.14
	Total	1.00		2.12

Source: Processed From Interviews, Observations, And Documents, 2026.

Because the rating scales of both matrices run in opposite directions from the axes of the Cartesian quadrant diagram, the weakness and threat scores are recalculated on a severity scale, i.e., five minus the rank, before the positions are plotted. A strength score of 1.38 versus a weakness severity of 2.23 yields a horizontal coordinate of minus 0.85, while an opportunity score of 1.25 versus a threat severity of 1.53 yields a vertical coordinate of minus 0.28. These positions fall within the defensive quadrant but close to the boundary of the turnaround quadrant, indicating that the program faces significant internal weaknesses, while its response to a slightly unfavorable external environment has been inadequate. The strategic implication is consolidation. Governance instruments should be issued and competencies built before expansion proceeds, as expansion beyond the current internal conditions has the potential to replicate the same weaknesses in newly formed units.




Figure 2. Strategic position in the Cartesian quadrant diagram

Source: Processed From Table 2 and Table 3, 2026.

Table 4. Strategic Factor Analysis Summary (SFAS)

Code	Key strategic factors	Weight	Ranking at	Score	Horizon
W1	There are no instructions for implementing involvement yet	0.14	1	0.14	Short
O2	Ministry training and certification has been running	0.12	3	0.36	Short
T2	Public perception of militarization	0.12	1	0.12	Intermediate
W3	Placement is not yet based on technical qualifications	0.12	1	0.12	Short
W2	Personnel fulfillment is not yet optimal	0.11	1	0.11	Intermediate
S1	Presence of units in districts and cities	0.10	4	0.40	Intermediate
W5	Alsintan has not been utilized and there is no management unit	0.10	1	0.10	Short
O3	Local government land and facility support	0.10	3	0.30	Short
S2	Organic production company	0.09	4	0.36	Intermediate
	Total	1.00		2.01	

Source: Processed From Table 2 And Table 3, 2026.

The intersection of key factors in the TOWS matrix produces alternative strategies whose analytical origins can be traced back to the combination of strategic factors that formed them. The strength of the unit's presence in the region is crossed with the threat of authority friction to form a dual chain of command and control design; the weakness of training outside the unit cycle is crossed with the threat of decreased readiness to produce a transition threshold and dual readiness index; the weakness of agricultural machinery utilization is crossed with certification opportunities to produce certified management and operator units; the weakness of personnel placement is crossed with equal opportunities to produce competency-based placement norms; while organic production companies and local government support form the basis of the integrated production plan and the battle barn concept. These five concepts are then grouped into three implementation alternatives: (1) regulatory instruments, (2) governance of competency and agricultural machinery, and (3) institutionalization of civil interfaces. The second alternative also includes preparing a source of qualified candidates, namely opening a skills-based recruitment route with an age limit of up to 28 years and recruiting Government Employees with Work Agreements in the agricultural sector who already have technical qualifications, without lowering basic military standards.

Table 5. Quantitative Strategic Planning Matrix of the three alternatives

Key factors	Weight	AS-1	BAG-1	AS-2	BAG-2	AS-3	BAG-3
W1 There are no implementation instructions yet	0.14	4	0.56	3	0.42	3	0.42
O2 Training and certification	0.12	2	0.24	4	0.48	3	0.36
T2 Perception of militarization	0.12	4	0.48	2	0.24	4	0.48
W3 Placement without qualification	0.12	4	0.48	4	0.48	2	0.24
W2 Personnel fulfillment is not optimal	0.11	3	0.33	3	0.33	2	0.22
S1 Presence of units in the region	0.10	3	0.30	2	0.20	4	0.40
W5 Alsintan has not been utilized	0.10	2	0.20	4	0.40	3	0.30
O3 Local government support	0.10	2	0.20	3	0.30	4	0.40
S2 Organic production company	0.09	3	0.27	3	0.27	3	0.27
Total attraction	1.00		3.06		3.12		3.09

Description: AS = Attractiveness Score; TAS = Total Attractiveness Score. Alternative 1: regulatory instruments; Alternative 2: governance of competency and agricultural machinery; Alternative 3: institutionalization of civil interfaces.
Source: processed from Table 4, 2026.

The QSPM results yielded a total attractiveness score of 3.06 for the regulatory instrument alternative, 3.12 for competency governance and agricultural machinery, and 3.09 for institutionalizing the civil interface. The difference between the highest and lowest alternatives was only 0.06, indicating no strong numerical dominance. Therefore, the QSPM scores are more accurately interpreted as indicating that the three alternatives have close priorities. Competency governance and agricultural machinery received the highest scores, but their implementation remains dependent on regulatory instruments that provide the basis for qualification-based placement and the establishment of management units. Institutionalizing the civil interface also received nearly equal scores and plays a crucial role in preventing the formation of parallel administrations. Therefore, the order of implementation should be determined by the relationship between institutional prerequisites and time horizon, rather than by differences in QSPM scores alone.

The five concepts can now be formulated. Tiered involvement places the authority to involve battalions on a clear ladder from military district command to Army Headquarters, according to the scale of the task. The rationale follows objective civilian control: the clearer the ladder of authority, the less room for politically dangerous improvisation [23]. The legal framework already points in this direction, as Military Operations Other Than War (OMSP) must be based on state policy and political decisions. Three postures with transition thresholds define measurable indicators for when a battalion shift focus to a combat posture, with potential indicators being a regional emergency status declared by the regional head, an increased threat assessment from the higher command, and an operational order from the regional commander, along with an estimated reconversion timeframe in weeks. Combat granaries manage production output as regional logistical reserves that strengthen government food reserves during peacetime and support prolonged operations during wartime, continuing Nasution's thinking on locally supported territorial logistics [19] and linking to existing reserve mechanisms so that unit output strengthens the national buffer, rather than simply forming parallel unit stocks. The dual chain of command and control separates the lines of development and production supervision from the lines of combat operations, with a firm deconfliction mechanism for local civil authorities, and it addresses concerns of militarization because involvement in the development realm requires concordance among the military, government, and society [21]. The dual readiness index measures both combat readiness and verified development contributions simultaneously, because assessing units on one dimension alone does not reflect capabilities whose effectiveness is determined by the balance of both.

Four international cases provide comparisons for these five concepts, demonstrating the consequences of each design choice. The United States Army deployed an Agribusiness Development Team in Afghanistan, specifically staffed by National Guard soldiers with civilian agricultural expertise and partnering with land-grant universities for technical depth [5]. The lesson learned is that technical competencies are sourced from the civilian workforce and not entirely developed within the military organization, while this pathway is not yet available in Indonesia. A source from the national nutrition agency supported this pathway, noting that qualified technical personnel with work agreements constitute a suitable talent pool as long as recruitment prioritizes productive age groups (E-3, interview, September 2026). Furthermore, the team is a rotational deployment, ensuring that competencies are not left behind within the organization after the assignment ends. This situation can be avoided by recording competencies in a personnel database, rather than individual assignments. These lessons underlie the proposal that the provision of production company manning should not rely solely on internal competency development but also include establishing skills-based recruitment pathways and recruiting government employees with work agreements who have competency certifications.

"If the PPPK are competent, I strongly agree that collaboration is possible. The more expert are extension workers, but these days, extension workers aren't just young people. It's better to have young people, as they have high productivity." (E-3, interview, September 2026)

China's Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps demonstrates a different design option, a permanent military-agricultural institution that survived for seven decades and evolved into an organization that manages its own settlements, enterprises, and civil functions [17], [18]. The institution's resilience suggests that permanent dual-role formations can be maintained, but its development toward a parallel administrative apparatus is a situation warned against by concordance theory and intended to be prevented through dual chains of command. Indonesia's design differs in its institutional standing, with the Territorial Development Infantry Battalion remaining an Army unit under the regular chain of command, without territorial jurisdiction or civil administrative authority. Therefore, the limits of this authority need to be outlined in implementation guidelines and are not sufficiently regulated through practice. Singapore's Total Defence, launched in 1984 and expanded with a sixth pillar, digital defence, in 2019, demonstrates a third option: resilience generated through the mobilization of the entire society under a governance framework that is deliberately updated as threats change [15]. European countries, after 2014, revived total defence into comprehensive national defence by dividing defense functions across the civilian sector [16]. Both demonstrate that it is the regulatory framework, not the instruments, that makes such arrangements durable.

Table 6. Benchmarking comparison of dual-role defense arrangements

Dimensions	United States (ADT)	China (XPCC)	Singapore and Europe	Indonesia (Yonif TP)
Instrument	Rotation task force	Permanent institution	Community programs	Permanent regular unit
Source of competence	Civilian skills recruited to the reserves	Internal, built over decades	The entire community sector	Not yet built; skill path not yet opened
Command position	Under military chains, while	Autonomous corps with civilian functions	Civilian institutions play a role in defense	Regular Army chain of command
Civil boundary risk	Low; deployment ends	High; parallel administration	Low; civilian-led	Moderate; demands firm deconfliction
Endurance ability	Reduced after rotation ends	High but depends on institutional trajectory	Height; framework is updated periodically	Depending on competency records and operational guidelines
Main lesson	Recruiting expertise from civil service	Establish authority boundaries from the outset	Set the policy framework, not just the instruments	Issuing governance instruments during the formation period

Source: synthesized from Center for Army Lessons Learned (2010), [15]–[18].

Within this range, Indonesia occupies an intermediate position, demanding its own governance arrangements. It has chosen neither temporary, skills-based deployments nor community mobilization programs, but rather permanent, dual-capability units within the regular force structure, and this choice demands more detailed arrangements than the other two alternatives. Empirical findings explain why this burden is urgent rather than merely theoretical: agricultural machinery is already in units, land has been allocated by local governments, and training has begun at ministerial facilities, yet none of these are linked by rules defining authority, thresholds, outcome governance, civilian limits, or readiness measures. This research, therefore, expands the literature on Indonesian civil-military relations, which has so far focused on macro-policy [12], [14] [11] by providing a new unit of analysis at the battalion level and its associated instruments. This research also extends the collaborative governance literature that treats collaboration as a cycle that grows or fades according to the institutionalization and commitment of its leaders [25], [26] by documenting

cases where partners, programs, and assets are all in place while the collaboration itself is not yet regulated by formal policy.

The international case comparisons in Table 6 reveal a pattern relevant to Indonesia's design: a sustainable arrangement requires an institutional framework formulated during the formative phase and updated as threats evolve. Singapore standardized Total Defense at its launch and updated it as threats evolve, while several European countries rebuilt comprehensive national defense through policy and legislative frameworks. In the Indonesian context, the current formative phase provides space to clarify authorities, functional boundaries, coordination mechanisms, and readiness measures before practices develop into institutional habits that are difficult to correct. Strategic positions of minus 0.85 and minus 0.28 are therefore read as indicators of the need for consolidation, not as a verdict on program performance.

Research Implications

Theoretically, this research expands the study of civil-military relations from the macro policy level to battalion-level governance mechanisms, linking them to collaborative governance and human capital. Practically, the findings demonstrate the need for integration between personnel competency mapping, training cycles, resource utilization, and combat-development readiness measures. Policy-wise, the five resulting concepts can be considered as material for developing operational mechanisms, which still require testing, simulation, and institutional validation before wider implementation. In terms of personnel provision, the policy implication is the need to study the adjustment of soldier recruitment norms so that the skills-based recruitment route up to the age of 28 years and the recruitment of Government Employees with Work Agreements can be used as a source of potential crew members for production companies.

Research Limitations and Further Agenda

The limitations of this study lie primarily in the early stages of its formation and the limited direct observation of one battalion in Central Lampung Regency. This limitation does not imply that the data source for this study was limited to one battalion, as interviews covered several levels and institutional elements, including the Pasipers Yonif TP 451/Satria Mangkubumi, brigade elements, the central level, academics, practitioners, the National Nutrition Agency, and local governments. Furthermore, five interviews were conducted verbally and two were written, resulting in inconsistent response depth. The strategic factor weighting and AS determination in the QSPM remain interpretative despite the inclusion of triangulation and an audit trail. The dual readiness index and transition threshold are also still propositions that require testing through simulations, exercises, and implementation in several units with different regional characteristics. Further research is recommended to conduct cross-unit validation and sensitivity testing of the factor weights and QSPM scores.

CONCLUSION

The formation of the 593rd Territorial Development Infantry Battalion marks a significant shift in Indonesia's defense architecture, while the mechanisms for inter-posture engagement still require more operational arrangements. Evidence from documents, interviews across levels and institutional elements, and observations of one battalion indicate that the main challenges lie not only in personnel fulfillment and provision of facilities, but also in competency matching, asset utilization, civilian coordination, and readiness measures. Internal scores of 2.15 and external scores of 2.12 indicate the need for governance consolidation. The study formulated five concepts: tiered engagement, three postures with transition thresholds, a combat granary, dual chains of command and control with civil deconfliction, and a dual readiness index. The QSPM indicates that the three alternative groups have close appeal (3.06; 3.12; and 3.09), so the results should not be interpreted as one strategy that unequivocally trumps the others, but rather as a basis for determining the order of

implementation based on prerequisites and time horizons. The study's main contribution lies in developing a governance framework for multi-posture military units at the battalion level; The framework still requires further testing through simulations, exercises, and cross-unit validation before it can be used as the basis for broader operational arrangements. It is recommended that the provision of crew for production companies be supported by the opening of skills-based recruitment channels up to the age of 28 years and the recruitment of Government Employees with Work Agreements in the agricultural sector as a source of qualified candidates.

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