

Legislative Incompetence Resulting from Poor Recruitment and It's Implications for National Economic Policy

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ABSTRACT

This study aims to analyze the causal relationship between the failure of political party recruitment design and the emergence of legislative incompetence and its implications for the quality of national economic policy. The background of this study is based on the phenomenon of low capacity of legislative members in carrying out legislative, budgeting, and oversight functions, which directly impacts the country's economic performance. The method used is an explanatory sequential mixed-methods approach with an institutional analysis and economic policy evaluation approach. Quantitative data were obtained from the profiles of members of the House of Representatives (DPR) for the 2019–2024 period and macroeconomic indicators, while qualitative data came from in-depth interviews and analysis of policy documents. The results show that weak regulations in political recruitment, particularly the absence of competency standards and merit-based selection mechanisms, have resulted in the dominance of legislators with low economic capacity. This condition triggers distortions in the legislative process, budgeting, and oversight of economic policy, characterized by budget misallocation, inconsistent policies, and low quality economic regulations. Further implications are seen in increasing fiscal inefficiency, a weakening investment climate, and hampered inclusive economic growth. This study concludes that reform of the political recruitment system is a fundamental prerequisite for improving the quality of national economic policy and promoting sustainable development.

Keywords: Political Recruitment, Legislative Incompetence, Economic Policy, National Development, DPR

1. INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of low capacity and competence of legislative members in Indonesia has increasingly emerged as a crucial issue in the national development discourse, particularly when linked to the quality of economic policy formulation. Within the constitutional system, the legislative institution holds a crucial position as it determines policy direction through the implementation of three primary functions: legislation, budgeting, and oversight. Optimizing these three functions requires quality human resources who not only understand normative aspects but also possess intellectual skills, technocratic abilities, and adequate analytical acumen. Without strong competence, the decision-making process risks being based on insufficient rational considerations and evidence, which can result in ineffective economic policies. Therefore, the issue of legislative incompetence is not only an internal institutional issue but also has broad implications for the quality of development governance and the sustainability of national economic growth [1].

In the realm of legislative formation, members of the House of Representatives (DPR) should have the capacity to draft regulations that are adaptive to global economic changes while being sensitive to domestic needs and conditions. The legislative process should ideally rest on a solid academic foundation, be based on empirical research, and consider a comprehensive analysis of policy impacts. However, emerging practice indicates a tendency for a number of economic

legislation products to be developed without a fully adequate scientific approach. Instead, the policy formulation process is often marred by the tug-of-war of short-term political interests, prioritizing compromise between actors over rational, data-driven considerations. This situation has the potential to neglect long-term development orientation, resulting in regulations that are less able to address structural economic challenges and less than optimal in promoting sustainable and inclusive growth. Thus, this issue reflects a gap between the ideal function of legislation and the reality of political practice, which directly impacts the quality of national economic policy.

A similar problem is also evident in the implementation of the budgeting function by the legislative body. Ideally, the deliberation process for the State Budget (APBN) is prepared with reference to a rational, measurable scale of development priorities aligned with national strategic needs. However, in practice, budget deliberations are often not fully based on these considerations, but rather influenced by sectoral and short-term political interests. This situation indicates limitations in comprehensively understanding the structure and composition of the state budget, including the fundamental distinction between productive and long-term capital expenditures and operational expenditures that tend to be routine and consumptive. This limited understanding reflects the low level of economic literacy among some members of the legislature, which in turn has the potential to hamper the effective allocation of public resources. As a result, the resulting budget policies are less than optimal in supporting accelerated development, increasing economic competitiveness, and creating sustainable and equitable growth [2].

Furthermore, the implementation of the oversight function, which should serve as a control mechanism for the implementation of government policies, has not demonstrated optimal performance. Normatively, this function requires the ability to conduct critical, data-based assessments, review program achievements, and objectively evaluate policy effectiveness and efficiency. However, in practice, limited analytical capacity among some legislators means that the oversight process is often not supported by adequate evaluation instruments. Rather than being oriented towards empirical evidence and measurable performance indicators, oversight activities tend to be influenced by political interests and power dynamics. This situation has the potential to weaken the checks and balances function within the government system, resulting in the inaccurate identification of various policy deviations or program inefficiencies. Ultimately, the weak quality of oversight not only reduces government accountability but also impacts the quality of development governance, which should prioritize the principles of transparency, effectiveness, and sustainability.

The low level of competence among legislators does not occur overnight, but rather is the result of structural problems rooted in weaknesses in the political recruitment system. The selection process for legislative candidates, which should be rigorous, transparent, and meritocratic, is often not implemented optimally. In this regard, political parties, as the primary gateway for determining who will advance to represent the people in parliament, play a crucial role in determining the quality of the resulting political output. However, in practice, recruitment mechanisms are often influenced more by pragmatic considerations, such as popularity, proximity to party elites, and financial capabilities, than by the intellectual capacity, integrity, and substantive competence of the candidates. As a result, the selection process fails to produce figures with sufficient capabilities to effectively carry out legislative, budgeting, and oversight functions. Thus, the problem of legislative incompetence is essentially a reflection of the institutional failure of political parties to carry out their cadre development and recruitment functions professionally, which ultimately has a direct impact

on the quality of parliamentary representation and performance in supporting the national development agenda [3].

Although political recruitment plays a crucial role in determining the quality of representation in parliament, the regulatory framework governing it in Indonesia remains inadequate. Law No. 2 of 2011 concerning Political Parties emphasizes the importance of democratic principles and transparency in the selection process for legislative candidates, but this provision is not accompanied by detailed regulations regarding the competency standards that candidates must possess. The absence of clear parameters regarding intellectual capacity, technocratic capabilities, and personal integrity results in the recruitment process being conducted without measurable and objective benchmarks. Under these conditions, political parties have considerable latitude to determine candidates based on pragmatic considerations, such as financial strength, popularity, and proximity to internal party elites. As a result, the selection mechanism tends not to be merit-based, potentially producing legislators who lack the substantive capabilities to effectively carry out institutional functions. Thus, the weak regulatory design not only reflects a lack of norms within the political legal system but also reinforces substandard recruitment practices and impacts parliament's poor performance in supporting national development.

The implication of this weak regulatory framework and recruitment practices is a tendency for political parties to disregard the principle of meritocracy in the candidate selection process, placing greater emphasis on the pragmatic aspect of electability. In this context, the measure of a candidate's success is often reduced to mere electability, without seriously considering the quality of capacity, integrity, and substantive competence that should be the primary prerequisites. This situation encourages the emergence of instant politicians with minimal experience and who have not undergone an adequate cadre process. As a result, when these individuals occupy legislative positions, they often face limitations in understanding the complexities of public policy, particularly those related to economic issues that require in-depth analysis and a data-driven approach. These limitations ultimately have the potential to reduce the quality of policy formulation, weaken oversight functions, and hinder the creation of effective, adaptive economic policies oriented toward long-term development interests [4].

Within the framework of the political economy of development, this condition can be understood as a series of systemic and interrelated causes and effects, ultimately negatively impacting the quality of development. A suboptimal political recruitment process tends to produce legislators with limited capacity, both in terms of understanding of substance and analytical skills. These limitations then have direct implications for the policy formulation process, particularly in the economic field, which demands accurate analysis, efficient resource allocation, and a long-term orientation. As a result, the resulting policies often fail to effectively address structural economic problems and even have the potential to create inefficiencies in budget management and distortions in market mechanisms. This causal chain demonstrates that the quality of public policy cannot be separated from the quality of the actors who formulate it. Failures in the initial recruitment stage will continue to accumulate and impact overall development performance. Therefore, improving the political recruitment system is a crucial prerequisite for increasing the effectiveness of economic policy and ensuring the sustainability of national development.

The consequences of poorly formulated public policies can be clearly identified through various empirical indicators reflecting development performance. One of the most visible impacts is increasing economic inequality, indicating that the distribution of development outcomes is unequal

and tends to favor certain groups. Furthermore, the low effectiveness of state spending is also a crucial indicator, where budget allocations are not fully capable of producing outputs and outcomes commensurate with the resources expended. This is often characterized by poorly targeted programs, wasteful spending, and minimal impact on improving public welfare. Furthermore, inconsistent policy quality and a lack of long-term planning contribute to a decline in investor confidence, both domestic and foreign, in the stability and certainty of economic policy. This uncertainty can ultimately hinder investment flows, slow economic growth, and weaken national competitiveness. Thus, the impact of poor-quality policies is not merely administrative but also has far-reaching consequences for economic stability and sustainable development [5].

Based on this background description, this research aims to examine in-depth the relationship between political recruitment design and the emergence of incompetence among legislators, as well as its implications for the quality of national economic policy and development outcomes. The primary focus of this research is to explore how the mechanisms, procedures, and criteria in the legislative candidate selection process contribute to shaping the capacity of selected individuals, both in terms of intellectual, technocratic, and integrity. Furthermore, this research also seeks to analyze the extent to which the quality of these legislative resources influences the process of formulating, implementing, and evaluating economic policy. Therefore, this study goes beyond identifying political recruitment issues but also links them to broader impacts on the effectiveness of public policy and the success of achieving sustainable and inclusive development goals. Through this approach, this research is expected to provide conceptual and empirical contributions in formulating more appropriate policy recommendations to improve the political recruitment system and enhance the quality of legislative performance in Indonesia.

2. METHODS

This research employs an explanatory sequential mixed-methods approach, a methodological strategy that integrates quantitative and qualitative analyses in a phased and complementary manner. The initial phase of the research focused on quantitative data processing to identify patterns of relationships and general trends between political recruitment variables, legislative capacity, and the quality of economic policy. The results of this quantitative analysis then served as the basis for the next phase, which involved qualitative in-depth analysis through more contextual and interpretive exploration. The qualitative approach was used to gain a deeper understanding of dynamics that cannot be fully explained by numerical data, including institutional factors, the behavior of political actors, and the socio-political context that influences the recruitment process and legislative performance. This approach was chosen based on the need to obtain a complete and comprehensive picture, allowing for a more accurate analysis of the causal relationships between political recruitment design, legislative competence, and the quality of economic policy. Thus, the combination of these two methods is expected to produce findings that are not only descriptive but also have strong explanatory power in answering the research questions [6].

In the quantitative phase, this research focuses on processing and analyzing data related to the profiles of members of the House of Representatives (DPR) for the 2019–2024 period as the primary unit of analysis. The variables examined include educational background, professional experience, and level of involvement in policy deliberations, particularly those related to the economic sector. The data is then processed to identify patterns and trends reflecting the legislative capacity in carrying out its institutional functions. Furthermore, these findings are correlated with several relevant macroeconomic indicators, such as economic growth rate, poverty rate, and income inequality, to examine the relationship between the quality of legislative resources and national

economic performance. Through this approach, the research seeks not only to describe the characteristics of legislative members descriptively but also to analyze the empirical relationship between these factors and economic development outcomes. Therefore, this quantitative analysis is expected to provide a strong foundation for explaining the extent to which legislative capacity contributes to the dynamics of economic policy and the achievement of development indicators.

In the next stage, this research applied a qualitative approach through in-depth interviews with several key actors directly involved in the political process and policy formulation, such as legislative members, political party elites, and economic experts. Informants were selected purposively to ensure that the data obtained represented relevant and diverse perspectives. Through this technique, the research sought to more deeply explore the internal dynamics of the political recruitment process, including the selection mechanisms, considerations used in determining candidates, and the roles of dominant actors within it. Furthermore, this qualitative approach also aimed to understand how the background and recruitment process influenced legislative behavior patterns, both in decision-making, policy formulation, and interactions between actors in parliament. Thus, the qualitative analysis not only complemented the quantitative findings but also provided a more in-depth contextual explanation of the relationship between the political recruitment process and the quality of legislative performance in the realm of economic policy [7].

Furthermore, this study utilizes content analysis techniques on various official documents as important secondary data sources, such as minutes of House of Representatives meetings, session minutes, and documents related to budget and economic policy discussions. This approach systematically examines the contents of the documents to identify specific patterns in the legislative decision-making process. Through this analysis, the study seeks to evaluate the quality of the arguments used by legislators in official forums, including the depth of analysis, the use of data and empirical evidence, and the consistency of logic in formulating policies. Furthermore, this analysis allows researchers to observe the tendency of dominant issues, the direction of debate, and the role of actors in influencing legislative decisions. Thus, the use of content analysis serves not only as a tool to describe the dynamics of policy discourse but also as an instrument to assess the quality of the legislative process, particularly in the context of economic policy formulation, which demands rationality and analytical accuracy.

To ensure the validity and credibility of the findings, this study employed a data validation strategy through triangulation techniques that integrate various data sources and collection methods. Triangulation was conducted by comparing and confirming the results of quantitative analysis, qualitative findings from in-depth interviews, and official document reviews, thus obtaining a more consistent and comprehensive picture of the phenomenon being studied. This approach enabled the researcher to minimize bias and increase the level of confidence in the research results, as each finding was tested from a different perspective. Furthermore, this study employed a member check technique, a process of re-verifying the interpretations with the respondents, who served as the primary data sources. This step aimed to ensure that the researcher's interpretation of the information obtained was in line with the respondents' intentions and experiences. Thus, the combination of triangulation and member checks is expected to strengthen the internal validity of the research and produce more accurate, reliable, and scientifically accountable findings.

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

3.1 Results

Table 1. Political Recruitment and Quantitative Profile of DPR Members 2019–2024

Profile Indicators	Quantitative Data	Interpretation
Number of DPR members	575 people	Population basis of analysis

Profile Indicators	Quantitative Data	Interpretation
High School Education	56 people (9.7%)	Minimum formal competencies are still significant
D3 Education	6 people (1%)	Very low
Bachelor's Degree Education	198 people (34.4%)	Majority of general graduates
Master's Degree Education	210 people (36.5%)	Dominant, but not economically specific
Doctoral Education	53 people (9.2%)	Very small for policy maker level
Background	The majority are non-economic (politicians, entrepreneurs, artists)	Minimal specialization of economic policy
Previous legislative experience	>50% members (indicative)	Elite reproduction, not meritocracy

Data shows that although most members of the House of Representatives have higher education, there is no guarantee that their expertise is relevant to the economic field. The predominance of general graduates and non-technocratic backgrounds reinforces the argument that the recruitment system is not based on substantive competence, but rather on electability and political capital.

Table 2. Legislator Capacity and Involvement in Economic Policy

Indicator	Quantitative Data/Findings	Implications
Participation in the discussion of the economic bill	Uneven distribution (active minority)	Domination of a small elite in legislation
Preliminary hearing attendance	±50% of members were absent (indicative)	Low legislative commitment
Proportion of members with economic background	Minority (not dominant)	Low quality of policy analysis
Involvement in the economic commission	Concentrated on a specific group	Knowledge oligarchy
Quality of meeting arguments	Low data-based (qualitative findings)	Non-evidence-based policies

Quantitatively and indicatively, only a small proportion of DPR members are active and have the capacity to participate in economic policy discussions. This creates an internal imbalance in the legislative process, where strategic policies are determined by a handful of actors, while the majority remains passive.

Table 3. Impact on Macroeconomic Indicators (2019–2024)

Economic Indicators	Quantitative Data	Trends
Economic growth	±5.0% (2023–2024)	Moderate stagnation
Poverty rate	9.22% (2019) → 9.03% (2024)	Slow decline
Number of poor people	24.78 million → 25.22 million	Fluctuating (unstable)
Gini Ratio	0.380 (2019) → 0.379 (2024)	Stagnant inequality
Gini Index (WB)	±35 → 34.9 (2024)	Relatively high inequality

Macroeconomic indicators show that, despite relatively stable economic growth at around 5%, improvements in welfare are insignificant. Poverty reduction is slow, and inequality tends to stagnate. This indicates that economic policies are not yet optimal in creating inclusive growth.

Thus, it can be quantitatively confirmed that the failure of political recruitment design not only impacts the quality of legislative institutions, but also has real consequences for national economic performance.

Table 4. Political Recruitment Design and the Production of Legislative Incompetence

Indicator	Empirical Findings	Impact
Recruitment regulations	There are no competency standards in the Political Party Law	Candidate selection is not capacity-based
Selection mechanism	Dominated by capital, popularity, and elite proximity	Quality candidates are eliminated
Transparency	Lack of public review and accountability	Limited voter information
Political practice	The existence of political dowries and buying and selling of ballot numbers	Recruitment is transactional
Output	Legislators without an economics/public policy background	Legislative incompetence emerges

This table shows that the root cause of legislative incompetence lies in weak political recruitment design. The absence of competency standards and the dominance of transactional practices cause political parties to fail to produce candidates with adequate capacity, thus directly impacting the quality of the resulting legislative body.

Table 5. The Mechanism of Economic Policy Distortion by Incompetent Legislators

Functions of the DPR	Distortion Form	Policy Impact
Legislation	Discussion of the bill without mastery of the substance	Ineffective and inconsistent regulations
Legislation	Insertion of certain group interests	Biased and non-pro-people policies
Budgeting	Negotiations based on political interests	Misallocation of budget
Budgeting	Minimal understanding of the APBN structure	Development priorities are not right
Supervision	Weak data-based evaluation	Uncontrolled government policy

This table illustrates how legislative incompetence directly impacts the economic policy process. The inability to understand the substance of policy leads to distortions in legislation, budgeting, and oversight, ultimately resulting in suboptimal economic policies.

Table 6. Implications for National Economic Development

Economic Aspects	Findings	Implications
Fiscal	Inefficiency and waste of budget	State financial losses
Growth	Not inclusive and not equitable	Economic inequality is increasing
Investment	Regulatory uncertainty	Declining investor confidence
Welfare	The program is not on target	Poverty is difficult to suppress
Development	Barriers to structural transformation	Stagnant economic growth

This table shows that the impact of legislative incompetence extends beyond the political process to the broader economic sector. Poor policies lead to fiscal inefficiency, exacerbate inequality, and hinder sustainable economic growth.

Discussion

The results of this study confirm that the issue of low legislative competence cannot be understood solely as an individual weakness, but rather as a manifestation of structural problems rooted in ineffective political recruitment designs. Quantitative findings show that, in general, members of the 2019–2024 DPR have a relatively high level of formal education, but this does not necessarily translate into a suitability of skills to the demands of the legislative function, particularly in the economic field. The distribution of educational background and experience shows inequality, with the majority of members coming from non-economic disciplines and having limited experience in public policy. This condition indicates a mismatch between the qualifications of political actors and the institutional needs inherent in their roles as policymakers. As a result, their capacity to understand the complexity of economic issues, formulate data-based policies, and conduct comprehensive policy evaluations is suboptimal. Thus, these findings strengthen the argument that the problem of legislative competence is more a result of systemic weaknesses in the political selection process than simply a matter of individual ability [8].

Further quantitative findings indicate significant disparities in the level of involvement of DPR members in the economic policy deliberation process. Participation in strategic issues, such as the deliberation of the state budget, tax regulations, and financial sector policies, is not evenly distributed among all members, but rather concentrated in a small, relatively more active group. This phenomenon indicates a disparity in legislative contributions, both in terms of capacity and intensity of involvement in the decision-making process. These results are further reinforced by qualitative findings, which reveal that legislative dynamics in practice tend to be dominated by a small elite, either with higher technical competence or with specific political interests. Meanwhile, the majority of other members exhibit passive tendencies, with their role mostly following the direction or policy lines of their factions without independently delving into the substance. This condition not only reflects weak individual capacity but also indicates a pattern of internal power relations that influence the distribution of roles in the legislative process. As a result, the quality of policy deliberation is less than optimal because it does not involve inclusive participation based on diverse arguments, potentially reducing the quality of legislative output, particularly in the economic sector, which requires comprehensive and multidimensional analysis [9].

Within the framework of New Institutional Economics, this phenomenon can be understood as an indication of institutional failure to design incentive structures capable of encouraging the emergence of qualified political actors. When recruitment mechanisms are not built on the principle of meritocracy, the system creates conditions vulnerable to adverse selection, namely a situation in which individuals with relatively low capacity have a greater chance of being elected than those with higher competencies. This occurs because selection criteria do not prioritize substantive ability as a primary factor, but rather prioritize pragmatic aspects that are easily measured electorally. Qualitative findings from interviews with party elites support this argument, where the candidate selection process is determined more by the candidate's electability and financial strength, including the ability to finance political activities, than by intellectual capacity, policy experience, or relevant technical expertise. As a result, the recruitment system not only fails to select the best candidates but also systematically reproduces patterns of underrepresentation. In the long term, this condition has the potential to weaken the performance of legislative institutions, as elected actors lack the incentives or capabilities to produce effective public policies oriented toward development interests [10].

The impact of this adverse selection is clearly reflected in the dynamics of the economic legislative process. Analysis of meeting minutes and discussion documents indicates that some members of the House of Representatives (DPR) still face limitations in understanding complex

technical aspects of policy, such as the use of fiscal instruments, the composition and structure of the state budget, and the consequences of regulations on the financial sector. This limited understanding has implications for the low quality of participation in deliberation forums, where arguments tend to be general and normative, and poorly supported by empirical data or in-depth analysis. Consequently, the policy deliberation process is unable to fully generate critical, evidence-based discourse, potentially leading to suboptimal decisions in addressing complex economic issues. This ultimately results in the low quality of the resulting regulations, both in terms of substantive accuracy and effective implementation, thus hampering efforts to achieve efficient, adaptive, and long-term development-oriented economic policies [11].

In the implementation of the budgeting function, limited legislative competence significantly impacts the allocation of state resources. Research findings indicate a tendency for budget misallocation, with spending priorities being directed toward populist and short-term programs, rather than strategic investments that add value to long-term development. This situation indicates a weak ability to conduct fiscal planning based on development needs analysis and projections of sustainable economic impacts. Qualitative findings further reinforce this picture, showing that the budget deliberation process in parliament often takes place as an arena for compromise and political negotiation fraught with the interests of both individual and group actors, rather than as a deliberative forum oriented toward policy rationality. As a result, the resulting budget decisions tend not to fully reflect objective and measurable development priorities. In the long term, such practices have the potential to reduce the effectiveness of state spending, hinder the optimal use of public resources, and weaken fiscal capacity to promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth [12].

On the other hand, in the implementation of its oversight function, limited analytical capacity among members of the House of Representatives (DPR) contributes to the suboptimal oversight mechanism for government policy. Normatively, the oversight function requires the ability to conduct comprehensive, data-driven evaluations supported by measurable performance indicators. However, interviews with technical officials indicate that parliamentary oversight practices are often not based on adequate empirical analysis, but rather are influenced by political considerations and the dynamics of power relations. As a result, the oversight process tends to be reactive and less systematic in identifying weaknesses in policy implementation and potential irregularities. This ultimately weakens the checks and balances function within the government system, as the legislative body is unable to fully fulfill its role as an effective and independent oversight body. A further impact is reduced government accountability in the implementation of public policy, potentially hindering the realization of transparent, efficient governance oriented toward long-term development interests [13].

The implications of various weaknesses in the implementation of the DPR's three main functions—legislation, budgeting, and oversight—are clearly reflected in the national macroeconomic performance. Based on quantitative findings, the Indonesian economy has indeed shown a relatively stable growth rate, hovering around 5 percent in recent years. However, this stability has not automatically been accompanied by an improvement in the quality of welfare distribution. Socioeconomic indicators show that the decline in poverty rates has been gradual and tends to be slow, while income inequality has not shown significant improvement and even shows a tendency to stagnate. This condition indicates that the economic growth that has occurred has not been fully inclusive, as its benefits have not been distributed evenly across all levels of society. Therefore, it can be concluded that the resulting economic policies have not been able to optimally address structural challenges in development, particularly in creating a balance between growth and equity. This phenomenon also strengthens the argument that the quality of public policy is greatly influenced by the capacity of legislative institutions to carry out their functions effectively and based on comprehensive analysis [14].

Furthermore, weaknesses in the legislative process that result in low-quality regulations contribute to legal uncertainty, which directly impacts the investment climate. Research indicates

that inconsistencies in policy formulation and implementation, as well as a lack of clarity and stability in regulations, are important factors influencing business actors' perceptions of investment risk. In situations where regulations frequently change or are not formulated based on careful planning, investor confidence—both domestic and foreign—tends to decline due to increased uncertainty about future business prospects. This situation not only leads to reduced investment flows but also slows the expansion of productive sectors, which should be the main drivers of the economy. In the long term, the accumulation of regulatory uncertainty has the potential to hinder the process of structural economic transformation, namely the shift towards more productive and high-value-added sectors, which are essential for achieving sustainable and competitive economic growth. Therefore, the quality of regulations produced through the legislative process plays a strategic role in creating legal certainty and supporting a conducive investment climate [15].

Furthermore, this study also reveals significant opportunity costs resulting from the low legislative competence in carrying out its functions. Public policies formulated without adequate analysis tend to result in inefficient resource allocation, resulting in potential economic benefits that could have been achieved being under-realized. In this context, the resulting losses are not only visible in the form of tangible impacts such as budget inefficiencies or poorly targeted programs, but also include lost opportunities to encourage higher economic growth, increase productivity, and accelerate the development of strategic sectors. In other words, every suboptimal policy implicitly carries hidden costs in the form of unutilized economic potential. This situation emphasizes that the impact of legislative incompetence is not only direct and measurable, but also has long-term dimensions that can hinder the achievement of overall development goals, particularly in creating efficient and effective utilization of national resources [16].

Taking these findings into account, this discussion confirms that efforts to improve the quality of economic policy are fundamentally inseparable from the need for fundamental reforms to the political recruitment system. Improvements in downstream aspects, such as strengthening legislative and budgetary functions, will struggle to achieve optimal results unless accompanied by changes at the upstream stage, namely the selection and cadre formation processes of political actors themselves. The absence of a meritocratic recruitment mechanism results in a limited supply of human resources with sufficient capacity to effectively carry out institutional functions. Therefore, reforms aimed at strengthening transparency, accountability, and establishing clear competency standards are strategic steps in improving the quality of political representation in parliament. With a more open and quality-oriented recruitment system, it is hoped that a legislative composition will emerge that not only possesses electoral legitimacy but also substantive capability in formulating policy. Ultimately, these institutional improvements are a crucial prerequisite for creating more effective, efficient economic policies oriented toward achieving long-term, sustainable, and inclusive development goals [17].

4. CONCLUSION

The conclusion of this study confirms that legislative incompetence is a structural result of the failure of political recruitment design, which is not based on meritocracy and does not require competency standards relevant to the function of economic policy. Quantitative findings indicate a mismatch between the educational background and experience of DPR members with the technocratic needs in legislation, budgeting, and oversight, while qualitative findings reveal that the political process in parliament is dominated by transactional practices and unequal participation. This condition results in distortions in economic policy, such as weak regulations, budget misallocation, and ineffective oversight, which ultimately impacts the national economic performance that is less than optimal, characterized by stagnant growth, slow poverty reduction, and persistent inequality. Thus, this study confirms that reform of the political recruitment system that emphasizes competence, transparency, and accountability is a fundamental prerequisite for

improving the quality of economic policy and promoting more inclusive and sustainable development.

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